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NOTES

WARREN PUBLISHING, INC. v. MICRODOS DATA
CORP.: CONTINUING THE STABLE
UNCERTAINTY OF COPYRIGHT IN
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Supreme Court proclaimed in the opening line of
its unanimous decision in FeistPublications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (Feist),' "This case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright
protection available to telephone directory white pages." 2 Simultaneous with this declaration was a collective cheer from a then-grateful
intellectual property community that had previously faced unclear
standards relating to copyrightability. Although the Court was dealing
specifically with telephone white pages, those in the intellectual property field knew that the rules declared in Feistwould be ipplicable to
one of the most confusing and controversial aspects of copyright law:
compilations.3

However, the stability and clarity that the Court seemed to promise was short-lived. Soon after Feist, a series of cases started to pop up
throughout the federal circuit landscape that seemed especially suited
to be run through the Feist boilerplate: questions of copyrightability
were supposed to be fed into one end, and the new standards were to
produce consistent and predictable conclusions. The opposite occurred. Different circuits got different cases with similar facts, but the
"fool-proof' Feist test produced different results. By 1993, the collective cheers of the intellectual property community had turned back to
1 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
2 Id. at 342.
3 The Feist standards are set out in detail in Part IV. In general, the Court proclaimed that works that exceed a low threshold of originality (creativity in selecting or

arranging facts) would qualify for copyrightability. See id. at 345-48.
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the familiar moans of uncertainty. The continued division and uncertainty regarding copyrightability continues and has led to the problem
of entrepreneurs' works being unprotected from competitors. Warren
Publishing,Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp. ('Warren") 4 is a recent case that
offers a good opportunity to explore the problems compilers face due
to unclear copyright standards.
Copyright is a broad and complex area of law within an even
broader and more complex intellectual property area. This Note
seeks to explore a limited issue in copyright law primarily in the context of one case, Warren. This limited issue is what constitutes the
proper interpretation and application of the rules governing
copyrightability of factual compilations set out in Feist and whether
the Eleventh Circuit properly decided the case in light of the
Supreme Court's declarations. Therefore, Part II of this Note will explain Warren, as it is a case that provides a real world scenario which
reveals the current state of copyright law as it applies to compilations.
Next, Part III will attempt to explain copyright in general: from where
the protection originates, how one obtains a copyright, and what it
protects. After Part III thoroughly explains the basics of copyright,
Part IV focuses exclusively on compilations and the Supreme Court's
Feist decision, and it also explains how the Court erred by not providing the compilation community with clear standards relating to
copyrightability. Part V will refocus on Warren in light of Feist and
explain how the Eleventh Circuit misapplied the standards set out in
Feist. Additionally, Part VI will analyze how the Eleventh Circuit's misapplication of Feist has led to inevitable splits between federal circuit
courts, and subsequently, compilers face not only the unclear Feist
standards but also variations among different courts in applying those
standards. Finally, Part VII attempts to provide some answers to the
current confusion in copyright-compilation law. Although many complicated solutions have been proposed, the simplest and most effective
idea would be to continue to build upon present copyright law rather
than abandon the current federal framework in favor of state law alternatives. The current legal scheme provides a solid foundation upon
which the courts or Congress can further clarify and simplify the standards for achieving copyright in factual compilations.

4

115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997).
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NC. V. MICRODOS DATA" COP.P.: A

BACKDROP FOR ANALYSIS

Because this Note focuses on compilation-related copyright issues
primarily in the context of Warren, it is important to introduce the
factual background and holding of the case at the outset. Warren
Publishing, Inc. (Warren) has researched and published information
regarding different aspects of the cable television industry since 1948. 5
The product of such work, and the subject of the litigation, was its
annual directory called the Television and Cable Factbook
(Factbook). Although the Factbook consists of two volumes, the controversy of the case pertained to only one volume, the Cable and Services volume. This volume is further divided into two sections:
Directory of Cable Systems and Group Ownership of Cable Systems in
the United States. 6
As the cable television industry boomed, and continues to boom,
cable franchises were established, sold, shrunk, and merged, affecting
not only ownership structures but also the scope of geographic service
areas. Warren took note of this fast-paced, quickly changing industry
and saw a growing need in the industry for comprehensive information on the current state of cable systems nationwide. Warren then
selected the information it believed would be the most useful to compile. Warren chose information such as the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of the cable system operators, the number of subscribers, the channels offered, and the price of services for the Directory of Cable Systems section. In addition, Warren included listings of
individuals or entities which owned two or more systems or franchises
for the Group Ownership of Cable Systems in the United States
7
section.
Next, Warren researched and compiled the names of every community in each of the states in the country that had any cable television services. Then, within each state, Warren identified each "cable
system" according to its new definition of the term: "an entity composed as one or more communities that are offered the same service
by the same cable system owner at the same prices."8 From this
smaller universe of cable systems, Warren now had a workable framework to arrange all communities within a state into its cable systems.
For cable systems that only served one community (Single System Operations or SSOs), the name of that one community naturally became
5
6
7
8

See id-at 1512.
See id. at 1511-13.
Seeid.
Id at 1521 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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a listing in the Factbook. But, to cut down on the repetition that
would result from listing operators which serve more than one community (Multiple Service Operators or MSOs), Warren came up with
the idea of determining a "Principal" community under which it
would list information regarding a particular cable system. 9 Warren
decided to list all other "nonprincipal" communities within an alphabetical system but also to include a cross-reference to the proper principal geographical community listing, at which the user of the
directory could find needed information regarding a cable system.
Microdos Data Corp. (Microdos), the defendant in the case, also
publishes information about the cable television industry. The difference is that Microdos does not issue its information in directory form
as does Warren, but rather on computer software. This software is
called the Cable Access program. 10 Like Warren's Factbook, Cable
Access is broken into sections-computer language and databases.
Only two of such databases are pertinent to this Note: the System
Database, which includes information on the various cable systems divided by state and city, and an MSO Database, which provides information on multiple systems operators in the same locales covered by
the System Database. 1
The crux of the litigation concerned Warren's 1988 Factbook.
Warren filed suit against Microdos, claiming that Microdos' System
Database and MSO Database infringed its 1988 registered copyright
covering that year's edition of the Factbook. Although discussed
more thoroughly below, it is important to understand that Warren was
not claiming an infringement of the entire Factbook, but rather that
the "method of presentation of facts under the principal community
headings, with cross-references to the other communities served by
that MSO, [was] entitled to copyright protection"' 2 and was infringed
by Microdos. Specifically, Warren claimed that Microdos infringed its
copyright by using Warren's communities covered/principal community system and Warren's data fields and data field entries. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled that the data
fields and data field entries were not copyrightable, but that the principal community format by which Warren selected and arranged its
information was copyrightable, and held that the copyright was infringed by Microdos. As a result of its decision, the district court
9

See id- at 1512-14.

10 See id. at 1512.
11 See id.
12 Id. at 1513 n.4.
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granted Warren's request for a permanent injunction against
3
Microdos' selling of the Cable Access program.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the
court below, but the decision was subsequently vacated to be heard by
an en banc panel of the Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit, en banc, reversed the injunction issued by the district court. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that Warren's data fields and data
field entries were uncopyrightable, but also went further and ruled
that the principal community arrangement was not "sufficiently crea4
tive and original to be entitled to copyright protection.'
III.

COPYRIGHT FOR DUMMrES' 5

The legal copyright issues in Warren apply specifically to a small
component of copyright law: compilations. 16 But before analyzing
Warren in light of the standards for compilations set out by the
Supreme Court in Feist, an overview of copyright law is appropriate.
The following background material is pursued because I hope this
Note will aid and interest not only skilled and knowledgeable readers,
but also those who may just be starting to research or develop an interest in copyright. This is not to say the current Part will not be helpful
to those with a substantial background in this material. Many misconceptions exist about copyright; it is a quickly developing and changing
area of law that leads to misunderstandings by scholars, and more importantly, to the entrepreneurs who benefit from using copyright law
to protect their works. Last, I develop a working history of copyright
law here because it would be presumptuous, and also misleading to
any reader of this Note, to enter an analysis of these copyright issues
without indicating the "from the beginning" approach I have taken in
learning and writing about copyright.
13 See i.L at 1512-14.
14 Id-at 1520. Later in this Part of the Note, the statutory requirements of copyright are further examined. As will be shown, creativity and originality are central
themes to modem copyright analysis.
15 The title of this section, "Copyright for Dummies," is not intended to indicate
that this Part is a remedial overview. I hope only to play off a currently popular title of
other comprehensive guides to various subjects: DOS for Dummies, Basketball for
Dummies, etc.
16 In general, compilations can be thought of as fact-based works such as lists,
directories, etc. that are helpful as a reference to their users. In Part IV of this Note, I
examine compilations more extensively, including their statutory definition and
treatment.
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Where Does Copyright Come From?

17
The Pre-American Origin

The history of modem copyright originated pursuant to the introduction of the printing press in England in 1476. Historians disagree whether copyright developed in response to the printing press in
order to further the philosophy that one should be able to protect
and benefit from the product of one's own labor, or as a way for the
Church to censor the publication and distribution of literature made
so much easier by the printing press.1 8 Regardless, it is undisputed
that by the mid-1500s, England's monarch, in accordance with the
wishes of the Church, declared that criminal sanctions would be imposed on anyone publishing without the required license and approval from official government and Church censors. England feared
that widespread publication would allow heretics and political dissidents to influence others, and the "Crown's solution to the problem
was a system of regulations designed to control this 'dangerous' art."1 9
As time would go on, these religious and government functions of
copyrights would change dramatically.
Close to two centuries later, the shift from the theory of copyright
as a tool of the Church and government to being an author's tool to
protect her works became clearly evident. The Statute of Anne,
passed by Parliament in 1710, embodied this shift in philosophy. The
language of the Statute is instructive:
Whereas Printers, Booksellers, and Other Persons have of late frequently taken the Liberty of Printing, Reprinting, and Publishing,
or causing to be Printed, Reprinted, and Published Books, and
other Writings, without the Consent of the Authors or Proprietors
of such Books and Writings, to their very great Detriment, and too
often to the Ruin of them and their families; for Preventing therefore such [injustices] for the future, and for the Encouragement of
Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books; [those who cre17 Although it may seem excessive to start an introduction to copyright law by
starting with a historical reference point of over 500 years ago, such historical
examination is helpful to grasping the evolution of copyright in the United States.
This brief overview of pre-American copyright history will aid the reader in learning
the context in which American legislators and courts have approached copyright
dilemmas.
18 For a thorough history of the development of copyright in England, see generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF PossEsswV INDIVDUALISM (1962);
L.R. PATrERSON, CoPYRIGrr IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968).
19

CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW

6 (2d ed. 1991).
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ate works or have rights to such works] shall have the sole right and
Liberty of Printing such Book....20
This statute is not only seen as the embodiment of the philosophy
that copyrights are needed to protect authors,but also the declaration
that crediting authors and protecting their works promotes further
valuable creativity and education from which society will benefit. Historians also credit the Statute of Anne as the foundation from which
the United States, and many other countries, modeled their copyright
21
laws.
The Early Evolution of Copyright in America

2.

The importance of copyright to American legal and economic development is best exemplified by its prevalence in early American history. As with most of this country's laws, Britain's influence was
obvious in early American case law, and original copyright laws
promulgated by the new states following the Revolution. Although
the states' statutes differed from one another in several ways, all of
them reflected the general purpose and spirit of the Statute of Anne:
to protect authors' works and promote creative works that benefit the
economy and public education. The Framers of the United States
Constitution believed that because commerce was already growing at a
fast rate, and expected to grow even faster, a uniform copyright law
was a fundamental issue that should be addressed in the new Constitution so as to alleviate the inconsistencies between the states' laws. The
Framers reflected this concern by protecting authors and inventors
explicitly in Article I: "Congress shall have Power... To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by Securing for Limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries." 22 Although the word "copyright" is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, Congress soon used the
concept of copyrights (as well as patents) as the tool by which it would
secure writings and discoveries.
By 1790, in accordance with the power granted to Congress by
the above-quoted Article I provision, Congress had passed the first
federal copyright law. The importation of the Statute of Anne was
20 Statute of Anne, 8 Anne C. 19 (1710) (Eng.), reprinted inJoYCE ET AL., supra
note 19, at 7.
21

ROBERT E. LEE, A CoPRIGHT GUIDE FOR AUTHORS 14-16 (1995).

22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Although the concept of "authorship" is not
highly debated or examined in this Comment, it is important to understand that "author" is used throughout this Comment "in the Constitutional sense to encompass all
creators of copyrighted works." LEE, supra note 21, at xvii.
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evident, as the first American copyright law contained similar language and terms, such as length of protection, filing and publishing
requirements, and the requirement that the government retain a copy
of the publication.2 3 This original statute remained in effect for the
following 119 years, until it became generally believed that the 1790
Act was not keeping pace with the changing economic needs of the
24
country.
In response to the perceived weaknesses of the 1790 Act, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909.25 The main and most impor-

tant difference between the 1909 Act and the 1790 Act, not to
mention the subject of most criticism of the 1909 Act, was its focus on
"publication"-making the work available to the public. Unlike the
prior Act, the 1909 Act conferred copyright protection on a work
upon the moment of its publication, not when the title of the work
had been registered as required under the 1790 Act.26 The 1909 Act,

while trying to lessen some of the burdens of the prior law, created
confusion because it proclaimed unclear standards and practices by
making the "published" versus "unpublished" works distinction. The
only works covered by the Act, and thereby governed by federal law,
were "published" works. If a work was "unpublished," the different
states' statutes, as well as common law, governed the standards and
methods for authors seeking protection of newly created works. To
further complicate the matter, even if a work qualified as "published,"
the Act was extremely rigid, full of notice, registration, and forfeiture
provisions.2 7 Although hoped to be a solution to the outdated 1790
Act, the 1909 Act resulted in heightened confusion, especially in the
authorship community, and thereby detracted from the purpose of
"[p]romot[ing] the Progress of... [the] Useful Arts," 28 intended by
29

the Framers.
The confusing and extremely formal nature of the 1909 Act was
not only ill-received by authors and inventors in this country, but also
by international lawmakers concerned with intellectual property, who
strongly disfavored Congress' early 1900s attempt at updating Ameri23

See Act of May 31, 1790.

24 SeeJOYCE ET AL., supra note 19, at 10-20.
25

Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as amended in

scattered sections of title 17 of the United States Code).
26 See id. § 10 (1909 Act).
27

See id. §§ 1-15.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
For a comprehensive view of copyright law during the period when the 1909

28 U.S.
29

Act was in effect, see generally 2

STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT

U.S.A. ed., Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).

(Copyright Society of the
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can copyright law. In 1886, representatives of countries throughout
the world concluded the first treaty regarding the treatment of copyrights in an international capacity, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention).30 Most
developed countries quickly adopted the resolutions made by the
Berne Convention. 3 ' But the 1909 Act's formalism was in direct contrast with the low threshold standards and flexibility embraced by the
Convention. As a result, the United States was forbidden membership
in the Beme Convention and became the "black sheep" of the international copyright community.
3.

The Foundation of the Current State of the Law: The 1976
Act 32

The negative fallout from the 1909 Act soon became obvious.
Many revisions were quickly introduced to deal with the unworkable
aspects of the Act. Nevertheless, it was not until 1976 that real change
occurred. The Copyright Act of 1976, 33 the modern-day statute, is
seen as one of the most significant and fundamental revampings of an
area of law in American legal history.34 "The former system was abolished because it was 'anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly
complicated,"' and the new Act was expected to "'generally improve
the operation of copyright law and would be more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the promotion
35
of writing and scholarship.'
Unlike the 1909 Act that conferred copyright protection upon
"publication," the 1976 Act confers protection upon "fixation"-upon
30 Generally, the Berne Convention was a response to Western European authors
who were bothered by the protection, or lack thereof, of their works when those
works crossed international borders. The Berne Convention sought to satisfy the nervous authors by creating multilateral standards and securities for authors whose works

will be sold internationally. See ROBERT A.
FOR THE NIEqrs 873-75 (4th ed. 1993).

GoRmAN & JANE

C.

GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT

31 Membership in the Berne Convention is so important because the twenty-five
member-nations develop standards that govern the recognition and rights regarding
copyrights across international borders. Membership is necessary to facilitate multilateral negotiations regarding intellectual property issues among member-nations of
the Convention. See H.R. REP. No. 100-609 (1988).
32 For an explanation of the 1976 Act, see COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRmIHT Act OF 1976 (1977).

33 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of title 17 of the United States Code).
34 See LEE, supra note 21, at 16-17.
35 1 NEr BooRsTN, BooRsTN ON COPYRMGHT § 1.06 (Dvora Parker ed., 2d ed.
1994) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976)).
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being created by the author in any medium that can be perceived or
reproduced. In addition to lessening the formalities for copyright
protection in terms of fixation versus publication, the 1976 Act eliminated many of the other hindrances of the 1909 Act, such as the rigid
registration requirements, automatic forfeiture if formalities were not
complied with, limited categories of copyrightable works, and the
short term of years for which a copyright was effective. The Act was
cheered by authors and noticed by the members of the Berne Convention, but the Act still fell short of the standards required to join the
Berne Union.3 6 Congress finally took the necessary action to become
a member of the Union when it passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act in 1988. 3 7 This Act eliminated the requirement of no-

tice of copyright for authors bringing suit in the United States who
obtained their copyright in another country.3 8 In addition, the Berne
Convention Implementation Act eliminated the requirement of the
1976 Act that mandated that titles of works be recorded as a prerequisite for filing a copyright infringement suit. The 1976 Act, along with
the Berne Convention Implementation Act, provide the current state
of the law in terms of the requirements for obtaining a copyright in
the United States.
B.

The Requirements of Copyright

With the history of copyright laid out, it is now appropriate to
discuss the basic standards for achieving copyright status. 39 The three
basic requirements of copyrightability under the 1976 Act are "fixation," "originality," and "notice of copyright."40 Since, as discussed
above, the notice of copyright requirement was eliminated to gain admittance into the Berne Convention, only fixation and originality are
now required, and therefore pertinent to further analysis.

36 For a listing of the general requirements of Berne membership, see

LEE,

supra

note 21, at 20.
37 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
38 It should be noted that although the Berne Act first eliminated the require-

ment of notice of copyright for foreign copyrights, today notice is elective for everybody regardless of where the copyright is obtained.
39 This Part of this Comment will generally examine the copyright standards
under the 1976 Act. For a detailed discussion of special rules pertaining to special
areas of copyright, see generally M. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW
§§ 1.1-1.15 (1989); BooRSm'N, supra note 35, §§ 2.06-2.17.
40 17 U.S.C. §102 (1994).
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1. Fixation
The 1976 Act quickly sets out the fundamental originality and fixation requirements:
Subject Matter of Copyright: In General
(a) Copyright protection subsists .. .in originalworks of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
4
otherwise communicated. '
First, the requirement of fixation in the 1976 Act was seen as the
biggest lessening of the rigidity of prior copyright laws. 42 It is also one
of the biggest misconceptions about copyrights. Now, copyright protection of a work exists upon creation, not upon publication. No formal steps must be taken by the author to register or file with the
Office of Copyright. Confusion exists because copyrights are often
mentioned in the same regard as patents and trademarks. But,
although generally grouped together, the process for receiving patents and trademarks, especially patents, is remarkably different and
more complex than it is for copyrights. To receive a patent, or rather
to have a patent issued, an inventor must receive a grant from the
Patent and Trademark Office. 43 This process is extremely specialized,
and applying for such protection often requires assistance of a patent
lawyer. In contrast, copyright is its own area of law, not dependent or
contingent on patent and trademark law.44 One important point to
note is that while copyright law does not require any complicated registration process to create a copyright, ownership of a valid copyright
is required to make a valid case for copyright infringement,45 which is
often proved by showing registration with the Copyright Office. But
the important thing to remember is since the codification of the fixation standard, copyright in a work can exist upon creation of the work
with no further formal steps taken by the author.
The point that copyright exists upon creation cannot be stressed
enough, as it is one of the most significant misconceptions regarding
copyright law. Simply put, "copyright is the right of an author to con41
42

Id. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
See LEE, supra note 21, at 16-19.
43 SeeJoycn T AL., supra note 19, at 25-26.
44 The pertinent statutory requirements for patents are contained in 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103 (1994 & Supp. II 1996): patentable subject matter, novelty, usefulness,
and nonobviousness. The requirements for trademark protection can be found in
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (d), & (e) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
45 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
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trol the reproduction of his intellectual creation. '4 6 Second, no formal
process exists to obtain a copyright under the 1976 Act. "Copyright protection subsists from the time the work is created in fixed form; that is, it
is an incident of the process of authorship.'47 This is why the 1976 Act is
thought of as so revolutionary; no official act of notice and registration with the Copyright Office is required. When an author creates a
work that is "fixed" and "original," that author has a copyright. Now,
under the 1976 Act, registration and notice of a claim for copyright do
not confer copyright protection. The Copyright Office does not
search files to determine whether a copyright application conflicts
with another copyright that has been filed with the Office. The primary function of notice and registration with the Copyright Office
now is to inform the public that an author is claiming a copyright in a
particular work. This registration may become significant because an
author must have a validly registered copyright to bring an infringement suit. Further, if litigation concerns two copyrightable works, the
work that was registered first will be favored over a later or nonregis48
tered work.
Returning to the copyright requirement of fixation, it is a relatively simple concept. The fixation requirement is satisfied upon creation of a work "in any tangible medium of expression. '49 Examples of
tangible media are paper, film, audio tapes, and computer memory;
the range of media is, for the most part, unlimited for practical purposes. Craig Joyce's explanation of fixation is instructive:
Under the [1976] bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic
indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means
of any machine or device now known or later developed. 50

46

GORMAN&& GINSBURG, supra note 30, at 13.
supra note 21, app. at 201 (emphasis added).
See id. at 202-03.

47
48

LEE,

49

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).

50 JoYcE ET AL., supra note 19, at 38. For an interesting and modem approach to
the fixation requirement, see Midway Manufacturing.Co. v. Artic International,Inc., 547
F. Supp. 999 (N.D. I1. 1982) (ruling that information on the video games Pac-Man
and Galaxia is sufficiently fixed to warrant copyright protection from competing video
game manufacturers).
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Originality

The second, and more interesting, requirement of the 1976 Act is
that the work be original; an "original work of authorship." 5 1 This
requirement, unlike fixation, has proven elusive to firm statutory or
common law definition. Neither § 101, the definition section of the
1976 Act, nor any other part of the Act, comes close to effectively defining what constitutes an "original work of authorship." But, as aggravating as it might be, this was the intent of the legislators. 52 They
believed that since originality was a fundamental component of the
protection granted to authors in the Constitution,53 the definition of
"originality' has and will continue to develop through interpretative
rulings by the courts.
The courts have broken down originality into a two-part test: first,
the work must not be copied or discovered, but rather be the author's
own independently produced work, and second, the work must contain a degree of creativity. "This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or [a] esthetic merit .... -54 These aspects
of originality are difficult to pinpoint and explain because they seem
so interrelated and dependent upon each other, especially when first
examining the originality requirement. The court in American Dental
Ass'n v. Delta Plans Ass'n summarized this confusing interrelation by
saying "copyrightability depends on originality, originality on creativity, and creativity on imagination."55 So, creativity is used in two ways.
First, applying creativity to the first requirement of originality, it simply means that the work should be the product of the author claiming
the copyright. Or, in other words, the author should not claim a copied work as her own.
The second requirement of originality is that the work contain a
degree of creativity, that the work be the product of the intellectual or
imaginative powers of the author. This stems from the fundamental
idea that certain things just are not copyrightable. The 1976 Act expressly lists some of those things which will never and should never
warrant copyright protection:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
51

17 U.S.C. § 102.

52 See BooRSTN, supra note 35, §§ 2.18-2.20.
53 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
54 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-345, 350-54.
55 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1714, at 1721 (N.D. I1. 1996).
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which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
56
work.
One can add "facts" to the above statutory list. For example, an
author cannot copyright that there are twelve inches in a foot, and I
can not copyright my idea that copyright standards need further clarification. Such things are considered public domain,5 7 and allowing
people to copyright such would detract from, not add to, the goal of
promoting useful works.
The logical question that flows from this discussion of the creativity standard is "how creative must an author be?" Happily for the aspiring author attempting to achieve the originality requirement, the
threshold has been proclaimed to be low. But unhappily, and further
discussed in a later section of this Note,5 8 the inquiry into creativity is
extremely fact-based, and no clear workable standard is evident. The
case that is often quoted as proclaiming the standard for creativity is
the already-mentioned primary focus of Part IV of this Note: Feist Pub59
lications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
In Feist, the Court proclaimed that originality requires only "a
modicum of creativity. ' 60 Such declaration would indicate a low creativity threshold indeed, but this standard has been the subject of
much litigation and continues to be one of the sorest spots of the
1976 Act. The standard has led to authors having to create works,
hoping it is sufficient to be deemed an "original work of authorship,"
but only to be sure upon litigating the matter when they believe someone has infringed their claimed copyright.
Since authorship is potentially so broad under § 102, courts have
had to examine such investigative, fishing expedition type claims by
"sculptors" of fish mannequins and koosh balls, 61 "composers" of
video game music, 6 2 and "authors" of nontraditional works. One such
nontraditional work, and the focus of the remainder of this Note, is
the compilation. This limited area of copyright is exemplary of the
application of the 1976 Act and is instructive of where the weaknesses
of the Act exist.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
57 The use of the term "public domain" here does not have a specialized meaning. It is simply referring to the idea that no one can "own" a fact or an idea.
56

58

See infra Part V.

59

499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).

60
61
62

See id. at 1288.
See OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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COMPILATIONS AND FEIST

Compilations and Their "Low Authorship" Status

When thinking of the term "author," one may normally think of a
novelist or columnist. It is important to clarify and keep in mind that
the Copyright Act has an expanded meaning of the term. 63 While the
original thoughts and stories of Charles Dickens or George Will can
easily be identified as "original works of authorship" deserving of
copyright protection, other works that may not "inspire the hearts of
men" nonetheless deserve protection. These are works that are so valuable to education and the economy that promoting and protecting
these "authors" is believed to be an equally desirable goal of copyright
as the novel or magazine column. Jane Ginsburg differentiates between the former novel-type works as "high authorship" and the latter
as "low authorship" works. 64 High authorship works includethose obvious results of the creative mind and subjective thought process.
These works are highly favored by the Copyright Act. Low authorship
works are more utilitarian-works of information. These works are
heavy on the effort side in terms of production, and light&ir on the
creative side. Compilations can be said to be the sine qua non of low
authorship works under Ginsburg's definition. Nonetheless, because
compilations, and other low authorship works, have such educational
and commercial value, they are protected by the Copyright Act. But
proving they are worthy of such protection continues to be a confusing dilemma for the authors of these works-especially with the apparent favoritism of the Act and courts for high authorship works.
Before examining this bias further, a brief explanation of compilations is appropriate. "Compilations" are expressly defined in the
Act: "A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship. '65 This definition shows
that compilations gain copyright protection not as a result of subjective content, but rather through an abstract methodology only described as selection, coordination, and arrangement.
The bias against copyright protection for compilations is exemplified by the simple statement made in Feist that "copyright in factual
63 For an explanation of the term "author" as it relates to copyright, see supratext
accompanying note 22
64 SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Valfie: CopyrightProtection of Works
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1866 (1990).
65

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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compilations is thin. '66 This statement is made although compilations, unlike many other types of works, receive explicit protection in
the Copyright Act: "The subject matter of copyright as specified by
section 102 includes compilations ....,,67 But even more important to
the examination of this Note, the Act also lays out the limits of the
statutory protection afforded to compilations: "The copyright in a
compilation... extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material embodied in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material." 68 This limitation is the codification of the longstanding principle that ideas, facts, and the like are never copyrightable. This limitation is not in contention, and there is not a court that
will state otherwise. But as concrete a fact as it is, it is peculiar that
courts and commentators exploring copyright issues seemingly must
always so strongly reaffirm the basic notion that facts are not
69
copyrightable.
The fact that courts and commentators must always remind themselves and their readers that "facts are not copyrightable" exposes the
true problem. The problem is focused upon a tension between the
desire and need to protect factual compilations, while a fundamental
premise of copyright law forbids protection of the materials which are
the very essence of compilations: lists of factual information. Factual
compilations, like databases, lists, and directories, are imperative to
the economic well-being of many industries. Therefore, as the 1976
Act reflects, "authors" of compilations must be encouraged to create
their works through protecting the products of their efforts. The importance of protecting compilations is not a controversial idea; their
importance to education and economic development is not highly disputed. But this view competes highly with an opposing fundamental
concept of copyright law that limits the scope of compilation
protection.
The factual materials within compilations-names and numbers,
etc.-are not copyrightable, which is easy enough to understand. But,
what exactly is protected in a compilation is not. Because although, as
noted above, copyright law now recognizes that compilations should
be encouraged by.protecting the product of the authors' efforts, such
recognition would indicate that hard work and research would qualify
66 Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 349.

67 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
68
69
DAVID

Id. § 103(b) (emphasis added).
See generally Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 347; 1 MELLVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B] [1] (3d ed. 1985).
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a resulting work for copyright. Indeed, they do not! The theory that
copyright should be granted as a reward for hard work and effort and
as an additional economic incentive to authors of compilations is referred to as the "industrious collection" or, more commonly, the
"sweat of the brow" theory. The theory was supported by various
courts7" and commentators, not to mention members of the compila-

tion authorship community, throughout the evolution of copyright
law in this country. But, starting in the 1980s, courts began to abandon their support for the doctrine. 7 1 To be sure, though, the value of
a compiler's labor was open to debate. That is, it was open to debate
until Feist answered the question once and for all.
B.

CompilationsAccording to Feist

The Feist Court proclaimed that the primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."7 2 Most courts and commentators
have viewed such proclamation as the final ringing of the death knell
for the sweat of the brow doctrine.7 3 So again, it is easy to say what the
copyright protection in compilations is not: it is not a reward for industrious discovery. But, what is protected in a compilation? Feist is
credited for exploring and developing, although inadequately, the basis for copyright protection in compilations.7 4
Feistaddressed the confusing tension between protected compilations and the unprotected fact within: "Common sense tells us that
100 uncopyrightable facts do not magically change their status when
70 See Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (finding telephone directory as copyrightable work by essence of the author's efforts in compiling
data); Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922)
(holding publisher of directory of firms engaged in jewelery business obtained copyright protection by means of labor in compiling information).
71 See, e.g., Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting court's prior holding in Leon that research or labor are protectable); Eckes v.
Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (claiming examination of plaintiff's
claim for copyright in compilation of baseball card prices should focus on independent creation rather on the author's labor).
72 Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 348.
73 See, e.g., Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1993); Priscilla
A. Walter, Facts After Feist: A Copyright Conundrum, 37 PRAC. LAw. 67, 68-69 (1993).
74 For a comprehensive anlysis of Feist,see generally Robert A. Gorman, The Feist
Case: Reflections on a PathbreakingCopyrightDecision, 18 RuTrGas COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
731 (1992); Gerald L. Lewis, Comment, CopyrightProtectionfor Purely Factual Compilations underFeist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: How Does Feist Protect Electronic Data Bases of Facts?, 8 SANTA CLARA CoMPUrER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169,
160-86 (1992).
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gathered together in one place. Yet copyright law seems to contemplate that compilations that consist exclusively of facts are potentially
within its scope. ' 75 With all the significance attached to Feist, a more
comprehensive look at the decision is now appropriate. As was noted
in the Introduction to this Note, Feist was believed to be the clarification of the "extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages, ' 76 but more importantly, to compilations as a
whole. As will be shown in the context of Warren, much confusion
and inconsistency are still apparent in the standards for copyrightablity of compilations since Feist, despite the Court's declaration
otherwise.
1.

The Facts of Feist

In Feist, plaintiff Rural Telephone Services Company (Rural), a
public telephone service provider, published and distributed annual
directories to its subscribers. 77 Like a normal telephone book, Rural's
directory alphabetically listed the names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals and businesses by limited geographical areas. The
defendant, Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist), published telephone directories as well, but unlike Rural's directory, Feist's directories covered
wide-reaching areas. For instance, the Feist directory that was the subject of litigation covered fifteen counties and contained 46,878 individual listings in contrast to Rural's 7,700 listings. 78 Feist obtained its
information by contacting public telephone service providers, like Rural, and asking permission to use their white pages listings in its own
directory. Of eleven telephone companies that Feist approached for
such permission, only Rural refused. Feist used Rural's listings
79
notwithstanding the explicit refusal.
Rural sued Feist in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas for copyright infringement, claiming the names and
telephone numbers copied by Feist were subject to Rural's copyright
of such material. The district court 80 granted summary judgment to
Rural, claiming that it was a long-standing rule that telephone white
pages, such as Rural's, were worthy of copyright protection. The
75 Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
76 Id. at 342.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 342-43.
79 Feist's unauthorized use of Rural's information was not in dispute in the case.
Feist even listed four "fictitious" listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to
detect copying. See Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 343-44.
80 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987).
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Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 8 1 ,The unanimous
Supreme Court reversed. First, the Court, as discussed above, wholly
rejected Rural's sweat of the brow argument, noting in conclusion:
"This, decision should not be construed as demeaning Rural's efforts
in compiling its directories, but rather as making dear that copyright
rewards originality, not effort. '8 2 Though kindly recognizing the
value of effort, the Supreme Court with such a statement laid to rest
the sweat of the brow doctrine. Further, and more importantly, the
Court refocused its analysis on what it saw as, and what has become,
the emphasis of the copyrightabiity of compilations: originality. Feist,
indeed, went as far as saying that the "sine qua non of copyright is
83
originality.
2.

The Feist Principles and the Decision's Effects

As discussed earlier in this Note, 84 Feistbroke originality into two
subrequirements: "that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possess at
least some minimal degree of creativity."8 5 And, also as discussed previously,8 6 creativity is not synonymous with novelty-the creativity required is slight, and "[t] he vast majority of works make the grade quite
easily, as they possess some creative spark .... "87 So, Feist began its
analysis of originality in a methodical fashion with these premises as
backdrops. First, the Court looked at the material in Rural's directory. What the Court saw were facts, which, as previously discussed,
are never copyrightable. So, compilations of facts, which are copyrightable, must find their originality by different means. The Court
found the means by proclaiming that the tension between
noncopyrightable facts and copyrightable compilations is wholly and
consistently dealt with by the Copyright Act alone. The Court turned
its attention to § 103, which proclaims: "The copyright in a compilation' . . . extends only to the material contributed by the author, ... and the only material contributed by the author that can
qualify a compilation as an original work of authorship are the selec88
tion, coordination,or arrangementof the facts employed by the author."
To break this down into simple terms, the Court embraced the foun81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990).
Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 345.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
See supra Part II.B.2.
Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
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dation of the Act and laid out these basic premises: just because a
work is entitled to copyright protection does not mean that the entire
work is entitled to such protection; only the parts that are original
(fulfill the creativity requirements) to this author are protected; and
facts are never original, so the only way and the only parts of a compilation that are copyrightable are the parts selected, coordinated, or
arranged in a sufficiently original/creative way. And thus, the Court
similarly summarized: "A factual compilation is eligible for copyright
if it features an original selection or arrangement of facts, but the
8' 9
copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrangement.
Note that originality (a work created independently, not copied, and
containing some minimal degree of creativity) must be found in the
compiler's selection or arrangement; 90 there need not be originality
found in each aspect of the work.
At this point, Feist' bell curve of helpfulness for clarifying the
extent of copyright protection to compilations quickly flattens. Because, while the Court proclaimed that originality must be found in a
compiler's selection or arrangement, the Court never defined what
these terms meant and, more importantly, just how creative one must
be in selecting or arranging material to be entitled to copyright protection. What we do know from the decision is that Rural's white
pages did not qualify. The Court said that the selection of names and
numbers of telephone subscribers was "entirely typical" of telephone
books, and "there [was] nothing remotely creative about arranging
names alphabetically in a white pages directory."9 1 Rural's white
pages did not meet the "extremely low," 9 2 "minimal level," 93 "not particularly stringent," 94 "modicum" 95 standard of creativity. So, upon
reading Feist, an aspiring compiler ready to devote her time, money,
and talents to advancing the arts or sciences has the inconclusive guidance that she needs more creativity than the white pages but no
more than ...

well, who knows, for copyright protection.

To be fair to the Court, cynicism toward, and finding weaknesses
in, the Feist decision comes from the benefit of hindsight. Nonetheless, Feist caused the type of confusion that the above discussion has
tried to exemplify. And as will be examined more in-depth below, the
89
90
solely
91
92
93
94
95

FeistPublications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 350-51.
Feist combined the coordination and arrangement requirements and referred
to selection and arrangement throughout most of its discussion.
Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 346.
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confusion caused by Feist has been reflected in a split in the federal
circuit courts in decisions defining the selection and arrangement requirements. Thus, while Tracy Lea Meade points out that Feist ended
"the seventy year split among circuits" 9 6 concerning sweat of the brow
versus creative selection/arrangement theory, the Court may have created a new seventy year split by not providing further clarification in
the standards of originality it proclaimed.
The lack of clear standards is especially relevant because after a
long wait, the Court had the opportunity to aid the most important
readers of its decision: the compilers themselves. As the last word
from the Supreme Court on the issue, a potential compiler interested
in what she needs to do to gain protection for her potential work may
look to Feist and mistakenly begin her pursuits. With the guidance, or
lack thereof, of Feist, this hypothetical compiler may believe she needs
only to be more creative in her selection or arrangement of facts than
the Rural white pages. As it stands now, this may or may not be sufficient to obtain copyright protection against an alleged "infringer."
More dangerous is the fact that probability of success in such a suit
may depend upon in the circuit in which a compiler files such an
action. Such inconsistency was to the demise of Warren.
V.

WRRE.A THE ELEvNTH Cmcurr's MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE
1_-ST TEST

At this point, this Note seeks to show through discussion of Warren the difficulty compilers face in protecting their works under the
current legal scheme. Then, the different approaches taken by various circuit courts will be examined. Finally, this Note will conclude
with some basic recommendations for clarifying the standards for
copyrights in compilations.
After the standards for finding originality in compilations-sufficient creativity in the selection or arrangement of facts in the compilation-were laid out, imagine the position of Warren. Warren, as
stated in Part II, had published its Factbook since 1948. 9 7 Warren believed it had protected its work from competitors by creating an original cable directory and filing a copyright. All of the sudden,
Microdos, a competitor, distributed a database that employed the
same information in a similarly selected manner as the Factbook was
arranged. How does a compiler like Warren evaluate its own position
96

Tracy Lea Meade, Ex-Post Feist: Applications of a Landmark CpyrightDecision, 2J.

L. 245, at 251-52(1994).
97 SeeWarren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1512-13 (11th
Cir. 1997).
INTELL. PROP.
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so as to determine its possibility of success in a potential infringement
suit against a competitor like Microdos? I would suggest the obvious:
the concerned compiler would look to the law, and the further interpretations of that law by the courts. And what is that law? Our concerned compiler would quickly learn, as we have, that facts themselves
are not copyrightable, but there is copyright protection for the portions of the compilation which are "selected, coordinated, or arranged" in an original way. 98 And, the compiler would surely
recognize that the foremost recognized case on the issue, Feist, holds
that selection or arrangement fulfills the originality requirement if "it
displays some minimal level of creativity." 9 9
This discovery of the basic format of the law would lead the concerned compiler in Warren's shoes to the belief that it had a pretty
good infringement claim against Microdos. One can almost hear the
thought process of a compiler such as Warren. "Sure, there are a lot
of facts in the Factbook which are not worthy of protection, but look
at all the original selection and arrangement of those facts." After all,
why should Warren not think such? Warren developed its own original working definition of a "cable system," and from that definition
approached the entire realm of raw data available to it. Armed with
its own definition and all the raw data it needed, Warren selected the
communities by a functional/operational method, then further selected and arranged these facts according to a newly defined "Principal Community" category. How, under current law, would such a
compiler believe it did not surpass the hurdle of being a unprotected
mere discoverer of facts to become a protected author? Judge
Godbold best describes how Warren achieved the status of author by
its original selection and arrangement:
The acts of selection carried out by Warren were a stream of events,
beginning with its choice of the facts it wanted and the construction
of a functional methodology in which to develop and present them.
The use of a geographic name for each cable system, and the choice
of the names of principal communities as identifiers, and the decision on a particular name, were not isolated acts of selection like
Athena springing full grown from the brow of Zeus, or a decision
made by a snap of someone's fingers, or a mechanical decision from
a single telephone call, or by numerous calls. They were parts of a
stream of acts of selection . . . part of the overall "work of
100
authorship."
98
99
100

FeistPublications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 361.
Id. at 350.
Warren Publ'g Inc., 115 F.3d at 1527 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately, the en banc Eleventh Circuit did not agree with
Judge Godbold's view when evaluating Warren's claim. As stated in
Part II of this Note, the district court in Warren ruled that Warren's
principal community selection was uniquely original to warrant
copyrightability. The Eleventh Circuit reversed this finding on the basis of a few different rationales that are inconsistent with Feist and
copyright law in general. 1 1
First, and briefly, the Eleventh Circuit focused part of its attention on the use of the word "system" by the district court; the district
court used "system" to describe and protect Warren's selection and
arrangement for principal communities. 0 2 The 1976 Act excludes
any "system" from copyright protection. 10 3 But, this point deserves little attention here because even the Eleventh Circuit shied away from
this weak argument, spending little time addressing it. The word "system" in the Act is coupled with "idea, procedure, ... concept, principle, or discovery,"' 0 4 emphasizing the already discussed fundamental
that facts and ideas are not copyrightable. But unlike the Act, the
district court used the word "system" in a more ordinary sense, as
describing Warren's whole operational system. Contrarily, the situation the Act seeks to forbid is someone trying to claim a copyright in a
fact or a method of discovery of such fact. And, here "[i] t seems beyond argument that Warren does not seek copyright protection on
the idea of gathering and selecting data and reporting it in a manner
that responds to the perceived needs for functional data of a changeable and changing industry. Rather it seeks a copyright on its expres05
sion of that idea.'
Although the court did not address the issue of the word "system"
extensively, the mere presence of such argument exemplifies how the
court acted contrary to the promotional spirit of the law, by focusing
attention on semantics of the lower court rather than on the possible
copyrightable aspects of Warren's Factbook. The Act, and Feist interpreting it, even with all the loose ends it left, made clear that original101 It is important to keep in mind the history of copyright laid out in Part III.
Copyright statutes from the Statute of Anne up to the current laws proclaim a fundamental interest in protecting authors so as to encourage them to produce works that
will aid education, economy, etc. In addition, Feist's emphasis on the low level of
creativity required for protection supports the spirit of the evolution of the law manifested in the 1976 Act. The standards for copyrightabilty were intentionally lessened
so as to simplify the process of achieving copyright status. See supra Part III.
102 See Warren Publ' Inc., 115 F.3d at 1517.
103 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
104 Id.
105 Warren Publ'g Inc., 115 F.3d at 1530 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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ity is the basis of copyright protection and should be the emphasis of
examining courts.
An opponent of this view will easily contradict the above argument by saying that the Warren court did emphasize the originality, or
lack thereof, in the case. But, while the court did fully examine and
ultimately rejected the original selection ruling by the district court,
the Eleventh Circuit again ruled contrary to the spirit of the Copyright
Act and Feist. The court rejected the claim that Warren's selection was
sufficiently original to gain copyright protection. The court claimed
that Warren did not select what communities or cable systems to include in its Factbook, but rather the Federal Communications Com10 6
mission (FCC) and the various cable operators themselves did.
Using the Illinois as a test state, the court compared the 724 communities the FCC listed with those listed by Warren. The court claimed
that Warren made no original selection as to the communities because not only did Warren list the 724 communities listed by the FCC,
but also Warren listed additional communities for a total of over 1,000
principal and nonprincipal communities listed for Illinois. 10 7 But, the
court erred by dismissing the fact that Warren only listed 406 principal communities from the FCC universe, and this is the expression
that the district court found sufficiently original (creative) to warrant
copyrightability. Warren showed the required "exercise of judgment
in choosing which facts from a given body of data to include in a compilation."' 08 Warren took from a large universe the communities it
discovered from the FCC, cable operators, and other resources, and at
that point had an uncopyrightable method of discovery. But, Warren
went further, exercised its judgment, and selected-according to its
principal community units-the facts which it would include in the
Factbook. And, as stated earlier, the selection of the principal community was an original expression not based on prior existing classifications or a mechanical system; it was a series of creative selection and
arrangement decisions based on its original redefining of a cable system. Warren's Factbook represented "a fundamental change in reporting data of a changing and developing industry."'10 9
What makes the Warren decision so perplexing is the way the
Eleventh Circuit so heavily relied on Feist in reaching its decision,
notwithstanding Feist's contrary proclamations. Feist, as repeatedly
106 See Warren Publ'g Inc., 115 F.3d at 1517-20.
107 See id. at 1518.
108 Id. at 1525 (Godbold, J. dissenting) (paraphrasing Key Publications, Inc. v.
Chinatown Today Pub. Enters., 945 F.2d 509, at 513 (2d Cir. 1991)).
109 Id. at 1524 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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stated, supports a low threshold standard for achieving originality
needed in selection or arrangement. But, as we know, the standard is
not nonexistent: "The standard of originality is low, but it does exist."1 10 After evaluating white pages that listed all telephone subscribers in alphabetical order, as virtually all white pages do, the Court
concluded that Rural's selection and arrangement was of the limited
type that was not sufficiently creative to warrant copyrightability.
"Given that some works must fail [the test], we cannot imagine a more
likely candidate." '1 By holding against Warren, the Eleventh Circuit
put the Factbook in the same limited category of insufficiently creative
works as the telephone white pages published by Rural. The court
made this comparison despite Warren's admittedly innovative definition of a cable system and Warren's principal community selection
and arrangement. The Warren dissent pinpointed the weakness of the
court's holding when it concluded: "Warren's selection of data is original, creative and useful. To suggest it is the only conceivable useful
2
way [like Rural's white pages] is astonishing."'
In the Eleventh Circuit's defense, many of the interpretive questions would not exist if Feist had further clarified the standards for
originality in selection, coordination, or arrangement. But, even with
unclear standards, Feist clearly calls for a low standard and does not
support the heightened standard the Eleventh Circuit applies to such
cases." 3 The spirit of Feistsupports seeking protection of authors; the
Feist Court sought to protect Rural, but after analysis decided it simply
was not possible. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit raised the originality hurdle set by Feist and sought not to find the means of protecting
Rural; rather, the court ignored the Factbook's showings of originality, especially compared to the Rural white pages.
VI. DFRENT REsULTs iN D=mFRENT PLAcEs: A TRuE DANGER
Although Warren contradicts the spirit of the Copyright Act and
Feist by creating too high of a standard for originality, the most dangerous result of the decision is that it perpetuates the weakest aspect
of Feistby failing to clarify the requisite level of originality for compilers basing expressive decisions on the case. Like Feist, Warren leaves us
110 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
111 Id. at 364.
112 Warren Publ'g Inc., 115 F.3d at 1530 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
113 For another Eleventh Circuit decision that applies a heightened standard to
the originality requirement for compilations, see Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (1993) (holding that yellow pages publisher's selection, arrangement, or coordination of information related
to Miami area businesses was not sufficiently original to warrant copyrightability).
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with the knowledge that the particular work in controversy does not
make the grade, but that is all. What does make the grade and the
steps necessary are left unclear. All we know is that the standard
seems high in the Eleventh Circuit. By dictating a strict standard for
originality in contrast to the spirit of Feist, the Eleventh Circuit set the
stage for inconsistencies throughout the various circuits. And, to be
sure, this has been the result.
The split in the circuits regarding the standards for originality in
compilations is extensively written upon, so this discussion is intentionally left as brief as possible. The most striking contrast among the
circuits is between the Eleventh and Second Circuits."14 In 1991, the
Second Circuit decided Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing
Enterprises, Inc. 1 5 In Key Publications,the court found originality in a
yellow pages directory created specifically to serve the Chinese community in New York City. The court, newly faced with the standards
proclaimed in Feist, recognized that the standard for originality was
low. Accordingly, the court said that Key's arrangement of businesses
into listings that corresponded with Chinese interests and tastes and
Key's selection of businesses relevant to the Chinese population made
those sections sufficiently original to warrant copyrightability. 116 This
low threshold approach taken by the Second Circuit shows how differently the Second and Eleventh Circuits view the standards set out in
Feist, while the Eleventh Circuit raises the originality mark, the Second
Circuit reads and applies Feist by looking at its clear language: the
standard for originality is low and should be easily attainable. The
division between different courts does not stop with these two circuits;
the division is evident throughout the country. The approach taken
17
by the Eleventh Circuit is similarly seen in the Seventh Circuit,"
while courts in the Fifth, 118 Fourth,"19 and Second 20 Circuits have
embraced the low threshold view.
114 For a comprehensive and informative view of the contrasting views of the Second and Eleventh Circuits, see Ethan L. Wood, Note, Copyrighting the Yellow Pages:
Finding Originality in Factual Compilations,78 MINN. L. REw. 1319, 1332-34 (1994).
115 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).

116 See id. at 514-15.
117

See, e.g., Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding title

insurer's selection of facts to be included in title commitment insufficiently original
to warrant copy-ightability).
118 See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 46 F.3d 408
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that "input" and "output" formats of plaintiffs computer

program contained sufficient original selection and arrangement to qualify as copyrightable work).
119 See, e.g., Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors v. Realty Photo Master Corp.,
No. 95-2488, 1996 WL 412584, at *1 (4th Cir. July 24, 1996) (affirming that plaintiff
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The divisions between the courts can have negative implications
on those planning to create compilations. The amount of protection
an author receives may depend on which jurisdiction that author is
located. An unaware compiler in Georgia, like Warren, may not be
protected, while ifin New York, like Key, she would be. With a federal
law, like the Copyright Act, such drastic discrepancies based on location should not result. At the very least, the protection provided to
authors and the standards they face should be uniform throughout
the country. Because Feist did not clarify, as it set out to do, the standards for originality in selection, coordination, or arrangement necessary for copyright protection, uniformity is indeed lacking: Warren's
unique selection and arrangement is deemed insufficient, while Key's
similar facts resulted in a decision affirming copyrightability.
VII.

A.

WHAT Is TO

BE DoNE?

Unclear, High Standards of Originality at Whose Expense?

As can be seen by the general theme of this Note, I believe the
law, and more importantly, the courts' interpretation of the law in
regards to copyrightablity of factual compilations, is dangerously unclear. It is dangerous because as much as this topic offers material to
be debated, researched, and written upon by academics, the academics who engage in such debate are not the people suffering. Rather,
the actual compilers themselves are the victims of the uncertainty, and
people are overlooking this point. I would imagine that an entrepreneur would be more satisfied with a clear standard to work with in
developing a copyrightable work than with the knowledge that her
misfortune offered me the opportunity to write a law review Note on
the topic. For this reason, it is important to find a solution to the
current problems within copyright law as it applies to compilations.
People must work within the system, and their future success may depend on the state of the law. Compilers likely do not care much about
the legal intrigue or the scholarly debate; they will not find solace in
such symposiums, lectures, or writings. Their solace can only be
found in decisive legislative and judicial action.
One need not search the databases too thoroughly to find scholarly articles answering the present question, "What ought to be done?"
realtor's directory of property listings was copyrightable and was infringed by defendant's computerized listing of such properties).
120 See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that publisher's vehicle valuation compilation was sufficiently
original under Feist because, although publisher's compilation was modest, Feist requires only a low level of creativity).
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But, the following suggestions differ from the current trend of examining solutions to the copyright confusion, and these suggestions are
comparatively simpler than others. While some are looking for protection in alternatives to the Copyright Law in state law licensing
agreements, contracts, or amendments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 12 1 the problems can be solved by working within the federal
copyright law regime. Requiring authors to find and use an alternative because the law intended to protect their rights is not doing its
job is defeating to an area of the law that has developed over a 500
year span. Remember the Statute of Anne and the subsequent debates that led to the 1976 Act. Remember the struggle to gain acceptance to the Berne Convention. All of these efforts reflect the
fundamental concept that a lessening of the burden to obtain copyright protection is a goal of copyright law. To abandon the progress
made on developing a uniform law in favor of alternatives is
premature.
B. It's Broken-Not Dead-Let's Fix It!
The easiest way to aid the compiling community is a re-examination of Feist. The focus of this Note, Warren, provided the Court with
an opportunity to expand upon its ruling in Feist. Unfortunately, during the course of writing this Note, the Court rejected Warren's petition for appeal. Nonetheless, Feist needs to be re-examined. Others
agree that the case that was supposed to provide a workable framework for such issues has created, not answered, questions.
Obviously, Feistwill require that much of the law touching copyright
in fact works be rewritten. Eventually, this may bring some clarity
into a field which is now in substantial disarray. That disarray is
more than a problem of aesthetics. It generates confusion about
the extent of the protection available for some of the most important information products now being generated and marketed
122

A reexamination of Feist, in order to create clear standards for
the compilation community, is key to helping those who need it most.
Compiler-authors need more guidance in how original their selection,
coordination, or arrangement need be, especially when it is easy for
even the compilers themselves to notice the obvious "thinness" of
their copyright claim. Authors know facts are not copyrightable, but
compilations are. How they reach the threshold between unprotected
121 See Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Futureof Information Commerce Under Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principals,46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1656-63 (1997).
122 JoYcE ET AL., supra note 19, at 215.
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facts and copyrightable expression of such facts is what needs to be
defined. Even if it is the high threshold imposed by the Eleventh Circuit and others, authors would be better off knowing now than being
defeated later.
It must be reemphasized that a high threshold, clear standard is a
solution with benefits; however, a low threshold, clear standard is
more desirable than none. The evolving spirit of the copyright law is
clear: "To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."' 2 3 A low
threshold better helps achieve this spirit. A commentator correctly
pointed out that, while supporting Feist's repudiation of the sweat of
the brow doctrine, "the Court established that the primary goal of
copyright is to distribute information to the public. Benefits for authors are secondary."' 24 While this statement may be true, it would be
wholly incorrect to say that the two goals are mutually exclusive;
rather, the goals are dependent. By protecting and benefiting authors, the copyright laws seek to encourage works promoting the progress of science, the arts, and the economy. What I am referring to,
and a subject highly debated, is the incentive character of copyright.
A lower threshold for originality would create better incentives for aspiring entrepreneurs who, by knowing that they will be able to protect
their works, will create more and, in turn, will aid reaching the primary goal of promoting useful works.
Some commentators say that the lack of copyright protection
does not affect the incentive to create fact-based works. ProfessorJoseph Bauer of the Notre Dame Law School has been kind enough to
share with me a series of correspondences by academics throughout
the country discussing such incentive questions on an intellectual
property e-mail listserve. Some of these participants question the incentive-creating power of copyright law, claiming that no economic
literature exists to support the contention that current law creates a
disincentive to produce factual works. Further, some of the commentators point out that academics always have incentives to create-tenure, prestige, etc.-regardess of copyright protection. While it is true
that it is difficult to find such economic empirical data supporting the
incentive argument, the intellectual property community's reaction to
Feist shows that the ones most affected by the unclear laws and high
standards are worried about where such proclamations leave them.
Soon after Feist, "the representatives of industries which might be adversely affected by such an outcome were swarming the halls of Con123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
124 Meade, supra note 96 at 272.
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gress in search of relief."125 The representatives' actions following
Feist indicate that they, the ones really affected by the decision, were
concerned about their future economic position.
Second, even if there is no economic data to prove that strict
copyright standards create disincentives to produce fact-based works,
such empirical data should not be needed. Regardless of the true impact, the history of copyright shows that the laws were highly motivated by a desire to create incentives for authors. It is truly against the
spirit of copyright law to say that, because there is no proof that the
law makes a difference, we should not worry about it. Plus, we again
must remember the compilers themselves. The authors of factual
works are not generally academics driven by desires for tenure and
prestige, but rather they are entrepreneurs driven by the desire to create, manufacture, and realize a profit. Such economic goals, and the
overall economic benefit that ensues, is best met with a compatible
copyright regime that provides clear, easy to reach standards of
copyrightability. People are not born to write useful factual compilations. For a creative mind that is also driven by profit, the options are
limitless. Why would such a person have equal incentive to create a
factual compilation in such a unclear, highly stringent context when
so many other clear, lucrative options exist? They will not! This is
simply human nature. Staying true to the incentive-type goals of copyright law, by creating a low threshold for originality in factual compilations, will best serve the parallel goals of promoting and protecting
such creator while promoting and protecting the creation itself.
Finally, the methods to reaffirm copyright law's allegiance to creating incentives can be reached in simple fashion. In re-examining
Feist, the Court or Congress should embrace the low threshold approach taken by the Second Circuit. As repeatedly stressed, a low
threshold is consistent with both the 1976 Act and Feist. The problem
is that neither clearly expresses a hard-line standard dictating such an
idea. Such lack of clarity has produced the split between the courts
throughout the country that currently exists. A reexamination of Feist
should build upon the existing framework, but also focus on declaring
clear workable guidelines to aid potential authors. Answering the
question, "How creative must I, the author, be?," should be the sole
goal of further judicial or legislative pronouncements.
In July 1998, Senator Rod Grams introduced legislation that
would amend the Copyright Act to protect collections of information,

125 JoYcE

ET AL.,

supra note 19, at 213-14.
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like Warren's Factbook. 12 6 The Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act (Antipiracy Act), as the bill is named, states:
Any person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all or a substantial
part, measured either quantitatively or qualitatively, of a collection
of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause harm to the actual or potential market of that
other person ....

for a product or service that incorporates that

collection of information and is offered or intended to be offered
for sale or otherwise in commerce by that other person ....

liable to that person ....

shall be

127

This amendment would drastically alter the Copyright Act by, for
the first time, recognizing and protecting an author's effort, the time
and money a compiler invested in her creation. In effect, this amendment would validate the sweat of the brow doctrine and turn the Feist
decision upside-down. In fact, the Antipiracy Act cites Feist as a major
reason why such an amendment is necessary, and parallels my concerns, stated above, that the current copyright regime fails to protect
the ones who matter: the compilers. The Antipiracy Act states:
[T] he United States benefits from having ready access to reliable,
up-to-date collections of information concerning all the endeavors
of mankind; ... advances in digital technology render information
products increasingly vulnerable to database piracy . .. ; current

Federal and State laws, including laws governing copyright, and misappropriation, do not adequately protect investments against this
free riding; as a result of the [Feist] decision. . .

,

and certain deci-

sions of the inferior courts of the United States, the copyright law
affords members of the United States business community, both incompilations of
dividuals and entities who create and distribute
1 2 8
data, little or no protection against piracy;...

The Antipiracy Act is the type of legislative action that compilers need
in order to be encouraged to create. Further, this type of legislation is
what we, the compilation users, need so that we will have continued
access to collections of information. While the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act may face criticism for proposing to extend
copyright protection to the facts themselves, processes, systems, and
effort-aspects traditionally not adequate to achieve copyright status
126 S. 2291, 105th Cong. (1998). The Antipiracy Act defines "Collection Of Information" as "information that has been collected and has been organized for the pur-

pose of bringing discrete information together in one place or through one source so
that users may access them." Id. § 3.
127

Id.

128

Id. § 2.
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for a work-the Act reaffirms an allegiance to promoting useful works
by offering authors incentive to create. Because the Supreme Court
passed on the chance to clarify Feistwhen it refused to review the Warren decision, the introduction of the Antipiracy Act represents Congress' status as the only body capable of extending protection to
compilers. Let's hope Congress, unlike the Court, does not pass up
12 9
the opportunity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The weary intellectual property community hoped that Feist
would provide a quick fix. Such hope died quickly after the decision
was delivered. The long evolution of copyright law has shown that the
courts and Congress have had to try an idea, see how it works, and
make the proper adjustments; now is the time for such an examination and adjustment. But, Feist should not be the last word on the
issue. Warren suffered from the present unclearness of the standards
of copyrightability. It further suffered from bringing suit in a circuit
that maintains a strict view of the originality requirements. Feist and
the general spirit of copyright law show that achieving copyrightability
should not be a complicated matter; it, more importantly, should not
be a difficult status to achieve. By pronouncing a low threshold and
clear standards for the originality requirements for selection, coordination, or arrangement in factual compilations, the Court or Congress has the ability to build upon and promote the evolving
jurisprudence of copyright law. It is time to recommit to the incentive-creating spirit of copyright and give reason for a long-lasting
cheer from a sure-to-be-grateful intellectual property community.
Ethan R York*
129 On November 3, 1998, I spoke with Lian Chao Han, who is the Legislative
Counsel for Senator Rod Grams, the author of the Antipiracy Act. Mr. Han informed
me that the bill got stuck in conference after consideration by the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Han also stated that Senator Orrin Hatch has promised to reintroduce a
version of the legislation next session. So, again, we will have to wait and see if Congress acts to clarify the protection offered to factual compilers. Telephone Interview
with Lian Chao Han, Legislative Counsel for Senator Rod Grams (Nov. 3, 1998).
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 1999; B.A. University of
Michigan 1995. I would like to thank ProfessorJoseph Bauer of the Notre Dame Law
School for his assistance with this Note, but most of all for exposing me to areas of the
law which I would not have explored but for his direction. I would also like to thank
my parents, Ronna and Roy York, Jennifer Magers, and William Hahn for supporting
me throughout the preparation of this Note and encouraging me throughout law
school.

